by Michael Shaw
Original article appeared on LinkedIn May 25, 2018, edited August 4, 2018
While the content of the text below focuses on areas within the profession of arms (specifically Army), I am of the belief that this line of discussion prevalent throughout the all working environments and is worth further consideration and debate.
Why is it whenever the discussion of complex problems or known points of friction within the Army arises, those most senior involved in the conversation without fail, remark, “ I never did ...” or “my fleet always was...”, or my favorite, “I would not tolerate..." Of course ladies and gentlemen, and we also all had that grandparent who walked uphill, to school, both ways, in the snow. Several explanations describe my possible experiences. First, perhaps I have had the privilege of working for only those singular leaders who knew the Army profession, knew their craft better than most and never faltered in their training or maintaining of soldiers or equipment. Second, perhaps their perceptions are shaped by what they perceived the units and individuals achieved during their assignment. Since many of whom I have worked continuously move along the promotional path, perhaps there is an impression that their way was the right way and thus defines success. Or third, there exists an inability to see the trees from the forest and the ability to self-identify success or failure is lacking. Somewhere amongst these paths, one will find the truth. I am no better in pointing out such truth; I am of the belief that such conversations are not isolated events, and only I am fortuitous enough to have worked with such accomplished leaders. If such accomplishments and set standards are the norms, how then is it that organizations within the Army appear to be struggling so mightily? If these leaders did as they proclaim then would not the workforce of today reek of the same training rigor or maintenance approaches that lead their past leaders to such heights? I find it hard to believe that somehow only these senior individuals had “the secret sauce” and all else have tried and failed or tried and not quite achieved. Why is it?
Perhaps these elders were successful, as individuals, but such success did not translate into continued success for the unit or subordinates. The success of one does not guarantee success for all. Ones own memory is a funny thing, you remember the achievements but block out the failures; unless they were significant learning points. Somewhere a piece of the puzzle is missing. As a footnote, the discussion of individual vs. organizational success in this context is not a discussion of selfishness, toxicity or any other negative attribute that is commonly attributed to individual vs. organizational success. Instead, the Army's evaluation process by nature is very individualistic. Through this annual evaluation process, supervisors capture completed actions within the rating period, and then their supervisor estimates the ratee's potential for service in higher positions of authority. It is no wonder when one presents a problem such as training plans, unit readiness, vehicle maintenance, etc., the answers all echo, "I was successful... not sure why these new leaders are struggling." Why is it?
Of the leaders I have engaged in conversations surrounding the topics of training and maintaining, I believe they speak the truth, from their perspective. I think they set high standards and that they held their subordinates responsible to much of what they established. I also believe that many of those leaders I have not had the privilege of speaking with also had similar high standards and would have answered in much the similar way. How can one make such an assumption? Most individuals that the Army promotes and additionally selects for a command are cut from the same cloth. While different assignments and organizations may populate one's resume, if we take a closer look we and remove the badges and names, we will see many of the same jobs, many of the same experiences, and many of the same generated outcomes. The Army is not a pyramid structured bureaucracy by accident. So then, why is it that training capabilities and outcomes are suboptimal and our maintenance and maintenance management is something less than desired? How is it that most commanders claim victory and their promotion to the next level of responsibility supporting said claims and yet we find ourselves in training and maintaining deficits? Both realities can’t coexist, can they? Perhaps as a service, we are too quick to reward individual success or high quarterly stats like shareholders looking for high quarterly returns. Maybe the current model of success is too near-term focused and completely misses the long game. After recent exposure to more senior levels of service, I am confident that the most senior of our leaders are looking to the long-term and no amount of spontaneous success during this present quarter mitigates historical trends over the past many years that communicate less than desirable outcomes. It is hard to sell a narrative that says we understand training and maintaining when the raw data says something different. Even more frustrating than battling raw numbers is having to begin each conversation with the term “yes but.” The moment one invokes a caveat is the moment the narrative begins to crumble. Right now it is hard to have a necessary conversation. Why is it?
Hearing the same broken record when asked why we fall short; “it’s the additional tasks”, “it’s borrowed manpower”, “it’s the last two decades of combat”, “we are not as bad as those other guys” and so on is no longer a viable path to discussion. Doing more with less makes goal achievement impossible, but today we have one of the healthiest budgets in recorded history, so money isn' the answer. Does the Army lack the skills and training necessary for success? Hard to make that argument when the Army's Training and Doctrine Command remains understaffed. Or, is the Army merely disconnected when it comes to expectation management? Is there an expectation that has developed over the past couple of decades that when we say change, it happens overnight. Perhaps all or none of the above play a role and the spectrum of work has changed such that our models of personnel, training, and maintaining is merely antiquated? Why is it?